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Abstract—Recent advancements in the field of smart machine-
to-machine (M2M) communications impose the necessity to 
improve the service delivery by enforcing appropriate security 
rules. Due to the large number of the connected devices, the 
criticality of the M2M applications, and the network stability 
weaknesses, we need to consider and analyze the security aspects 
and establish a flexible policy-aware architecture. This paper 
explores the relevant architectural challenges in this environment 
and proposes a Policy-Aware smart M2M Architecture (PAArc) 
based on ETSI’s M2M communications functional architecture. 
We explore the policy-based management aspects to improve the 
security of the M2M components and services and to mitigate the 
security concerns that arise by evaluating an Intelligent 
Transportation System use case. It is shown that the policy 
enforcement enables enhanced security management capabilities, 
increased agility, and better service levels in the field of smart 
M2M communications. 
Keywords—smart M2M communications; Intelligent 
Transportation System; policy enforcement engine 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years, smart machine-to-machine (M2M) 
networks have increased dramatically. The smart M2M 
ubiquitous computing features support low-power 
consumption, localized management and cope with the limited 
resources constraints. Concerning the network communication 
protocols, the smart M2M environments need to support cross-
domain information exchanges among several interconnected 
nodes. These exchanges complicate the operations of the 
routing and management protocols, the communication 
services, and the device reachability, and raise various security 
and performance issues [1]. 
Several M2M applications (i.e. transportation, human or 
inventory tracking, water or energy distribution and quality 
monitoring, personal area networking and habitat monitoring, 
data center monitoring, disaster avoidance and recovery, 
military surveillance and industry operations, medical or 
healthcare monitoring, process monitoring and smart spaces) 
rely on the capabilities of the smart M2M communications. 
Policy-based management allows the creation of certain 
condition expressions that enable the policy enforcement on the 
interconnected components and resources. The considerable 
benefits of the policy-based management approach grow as the 
smart M2M communications evolve and the resources become 
more complex. The resources turn out to be available to the 
interconnected components and can be accessed using 
interoperable services, while the existence of a service 
orchestration enables the automated arrangement and 
management of the resources.  
In this paper, we propose a Policy-Aware M2M 
Architecture (PAArc) which includes a cross-domain policy 
enforcement to achieve easier management and higher security 
of the smart M2M devices, services and communication paths. 
We investigate various service challenges, constraints, 
requirements and goals to identify the key-aspects to be 
considered. Additionally, we analyze an Intelligent 
Transportation System (ITS) use case to demonstrate the 
challenges of smart M2M communications. 
On these grounds, this paper is based on the European 
Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) M2M 
communication functional architecture [2]. Our proposal for 
smart M2M communications enables the enforcement of the 
appropriate security policies with a policy-based approach to 
alleviate concerns over security, and incorporates policy-based 
functionalities, service registry, analytics and other capabilities. 
The proposed PAArc secures the communication among a 
large population of heterogeneous smart objects, applications 
and services. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 presents the background work, whereas the proposed 
architecture and the policy enforcement model is presented in 
Section 3. Then, Section 4 conducts a model evaluation of a 
use case. A discussion by contrasting the two approaches with 
and without PAArc is presented in section 5. Section 6 
concludes the paper and presents future research directions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Several alternative architecture models akin to the OSI 
model have been proposed in the literature for the 
communication among interconnected nodes. The ETSI M2M 
communication functional architecture [2] standardizes the 
procedures for handling the resources and the information 
exchange over the M2M reference points. The ETSI M2M 
supports standardized security mechanisms (i.e. mutual end-
point authentication, optional secure sessions, RESTful 
procedures). However, the ETSI M2M functional architecture 
does not incorporate any policy-based management to enforce 
the appropriate security policies in a dynamic M2M 
environment.   
The Internet of Things – Architecture (IoT-A) [3] provides 
the communication needs in the IoT domain model. Although 
the model leverages the ISO OSI seven-layer, it is mainly 
focused on the interactions of the communicating systems 
between different stacks among the key elements, such as 
devices, services, applications, end-users in the device, and 
network domains. Cisco [4] has proposed the IoT Reference 
model, which consists of seven layers based on the control 
information flows. Still, the model does not support any 
security policies for monitoring and controlling different 
devices’ communication patterns. 
ETSI has established a technical body to provide the 
working items as a basis for liaison with other standardization 
organizations for the latest technology innovations in the 
context of M2M communications. Among these items, the 
ETSI M2M service requirements [5] describes the M2M 
communications security requirements and focuses on the 
M2M communications usage, the relevant technologies and 
methodologies. Nonetheless, the existing models lack the 
policy enforcement capabilities of the appropriate security 
controls that are necessary to establish a secure framework in 
the resource-constrained M2M networks.  
A wide area of smart M2M implementations is the area of 
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). The mobility of the 
nodes within wide areas and with high velocity combined with 
their resource contraints and the need for communication’s 
availiability make the ITS valnurable to security threats [6]. 
The security issues of the ITS involves and affects elements 
(i.e. nodes, devices, services, applications, etc.) from all the 
architectural layers.  
Regarding policy-based management models academic 
research, Ferraiolo et al. [7] present an innovative Policy 
Machine that manages access control policies independently of 
the hardware and software configuration. However, this work 
lacks the enforcement of security policies across different 
domains to address and resolve the latest security concerns and 
threats [8]. The policy-based key-elements are the following 
logical entities [9]: 
 Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): performs the decision 
requests, receives the policy updates, translates the 
updates appropriately, and enforces the policy 
decisions. 
 Policy Decision Point (PDP): evaluates the applicable 
policy against other relevant policies and attributes, and 
provides the decision outcome to PEP. 
 Policy Information Point (PIP): acts as a source of 
attribute values to make a policy decision. 
 Policy Administration Point (PAP): provides the 
authoring and maintenance of a policy or policy set(s). 
This includes a policy store, which is a repository for 
the policies.  
The increasingly voluminous interconnected devices raise 
various scalability, interoperability and service ability 
concerns. To tackle this challenge, the policy tool can mitigate 
network failures and security attacks without necessitating the 
development of sophisticated protocols and mechanisms. For 
instance, in the case of a failure or a network topology change, 
it should be feasible for the policy engine to trigger an event-
based policy action and to immediately and automatically 
reconfigure the network [10]. 
Barki et al. [11] provide a survey in secure M2M 
communications and categorize the security issues into six 
groups: (a) key management, (b) data-origin authentication, (c) 
entity authentication, (d) privacy, (e) data integrity and (f) 
device integrity, and they illustrate the paramount importance 
of the Identity Based Cryptography (IBC), and the ephemeral 
identity (pseudonym) in terms of privacy. Focusing on smart 
grids, Etigowni et al. [12] propose a logical policy enforcement 
by utilizing information flow tracking and logic-based context-
aware policies, while SCADA systems commonly prioritize the 
respective security requirements such as (a) integrity, (b) 
confidentiality, and (c) trust regarding the reliability of 
information [13]. 
One of the major security concerns in policy enforcement is 
the detection of policy violations. Maw et al. [14] proposed a 
model that supports the detection of security violations by 
examining the respective audit record in the hosted prevention 
and detection mechanisms. The authors also introduced access 
decisions for authorization, operational and obligation policies. 
The authors in [15] addressed the semantic gap between the 
policies and the low-level mechanisms by forming a simulation 
apparatus with various high-level policy languages for cross-
domain policy enforcement (i.e. XACML, WS-Policy). Singh 
et al. [16] enhanced the policy enforcement with event-based 
systems and addresses cross-domain policy issues, whereas 
Sicari et al. [17] proposed an enforcement engine which 
supports the management of new policies at runtime without 
any service disruptions. Other studies [21], [22] also 
demonstrate how to enforce security policies to present more 
secure communications models. 
In the next section the Policy-Aware smart M2M 
Architecture is described and the policy enforcement is 
implemented as a tool to efficiently address the above-
mentioned security concerns and management issues. 
III. POLICY-AWARE SMART M2M ARCHITECTURE 
A. Architectural Model 
Based on the ETSI M2M communications functional 
architecture, we provide a series of policy capabilities to 
facilitate the enforcement of the appropriate security controls 
and policies for smart ubiquitous computing. To efficiently 
establish a security framework, we incorporate a policy-based 
framework. Our intention is to generalize the security policy-
based enforcement at an architectural level. 
In smart M2M communications, the Device domain 
consists mainly devices usually embedded in real-life objects to 
monitor or control their operations. The data gathered is 
transmitted to the Network Domain and, finally, to the servers 
in the Application domain [18]. The Network domain includes 
the core and access network devices and services, as well as 
service capabilities of the entire architecture [19]. The 
Application domain is a group of back-end servers that gather, 
store and present the sensory information via end-user 
applications [20]. The exchange of information between the 
domain’s entities is facilitated by the service capabilities 
included in the architecture. 
Due to the agile nature of the interconnected objects (i.e. 
nodes moving from cluster to cluster) and the cross-domain 
operational effects of the services, a policy-based enforcement 
system can simplify the dynamic service redundancy and 
security. This Policy-Aware Architecture (PAArc) includes a 
cross-domain operating policy-based service and enhances 
security management of the nodes in the device domain, the 
access and core network in the network domain, and the M2M 
data and various applications in the application domain. 
B. Policy enforcement 
In this section, we present the analysis of the policy 
enforcement throughout the architectural domains. The service 
provider initially publishes the services in the registry (i.e. an 
XML-based registry to describe, publish and utilize the 
services). In this vein, we describe new services to establish, or 
leverage existing code (e.g. JSON or binary encoding formats) 
for re-usable services. 
The service registry maintains a set of published services 
with their associated service properties and the business 
process documents to facilitate any subsequent queries to the 
service registry originated by the service requester. The 
requester searches for a specific service in the registry and in 
the case of an existing and valid service forwards the request to 
the PEP to intercept the request into the appropriate format (i.e. 
using a SOAP transport message). Then, PEP invokes and 
binds the methods of the requested service to the service 
provider that provides back to PEP the outcome of the service 
request. Finally, PEP acts on the received policy-decision and 
translates the updates into the appropriate format for usage, 
which is then communicated to the publisher component (i.e. 
notice-board, APIs, text-messages and notifications).  
The model allows the publishing and finding of services to 
resolve the service requests with policy-based criteria to 
enforce the appropriate security policies. More specifically, the 
use of the service data enables the offloading of the metadata 
and of the service attributes into the service data repository 
providing increased flexibility of specifying many transactions 
with consistency, re-usability, and faster implementation in 
generic processing.  
 Upon receiving a request by the service-provider, PDP 
evaluates the service-request based on the managed policies 
already defined by the policy manager. PAP feeds the policy-
store repository with the policies. The relevant policies to the 
specific service-request are retrieved and consulted by PDP to 
reach a decision. If there is no blocking or negative policy 
decision, PDP retrieves the necessary additional service data 
from PIP, which offers the interface to collect the appropriate 
service data related to the service-request.  
Figure 1. Policy enforcement methods 
The policy-decision, supported by the service attributes, is 
forwarded to the service-provider to resolve the request. The 
detailed structure of the policy enforcement methods and of the 
corresponding abstract interactions is shown in Figure 1, which 
illustrates the entities’ interactions and the detailed messages 
exchange in a time-order manner.  
The policy enforcement is facilitated by the use of services, 
such as a Trusted Certificate Authority (TCA or CA) for 
issuing digital certificates, a Registration Authority (RA) for 
verifying the endpoint request for digital identity, a Validation 
Authority (VA) to verify the validity of the digital certificate 
with the appropriate technical means. 
IV. USE CASE AND ARCHITECTURAL MODEL EVALUATION 
In this section, through a use-case we describe how we can 
integrate the policy enforcement on the  architecture. We 
scrutinize the architecture for a use case and we elaborate on 
the architecture’s security requirements and concerns for secure 
smart M2M communications. 
In this context, we analyze the implementation of the 
security policies and workflows for the intelligent Bus on 
Campus (iBuC) [23], which has been proposed to offer a state-
of-the-art transportation service within a university campus 
utilizing multiple AVs, smart devices, and the existing wireless 
infrastructure and mobile services. The iBuC service requests 
are forwarded via a booking application to the control unit 
(CU) which accordingly calculates both the AV’s and the 
passenger’s estimated time of arrival (ETA) to the bus stop and 
elects an eligible vehicle to operate an itinerary for academic 
passengers. The CU also collects and analyses various datasets 
regarding the vehicles’ and passengers’ status by using wireless 
sensor devices, GPS and Wi-Fi communication capabilities.  
To evaluate the architectural model discussed previously, 
we contrast the iBuC operational scenario with an extended 
scenario where iBuC integrates the policy enforcement of 
security policies. In the following section, case A presents the 
workflows based on the original iBuC work and case B shows 
the messages exchanged with the PPArc architecture. 
A. Enroll/withdraw resources 
Figure 2. Enroll or withdraw an AV 
Figure 2 depicts how an AV can be enrolled to or 
withdrawn from the transportation service with reliable 
registration activities. In case A, the AV provides real-time 
data and the state to the Control Unit (CU). Along with the 
location, route-paths, service-bulletins, stop-list and the 
current route state (e.g. running state, idle state, near finish 
state) that can be collected by the M2M devices through the 
M2M network (i.e. wireless sensor network), the CU records 
entering-AVs (i.e. operate the next itinerary) or leaving-AVs 
(i.e. to be substituted by another one) to leverage efficient AV 
services.  
In case B and in the context of the policy-aware 
architecture, multiple entities enable the secure identification 
of the AVs and enhance the security based on digital identity 
assertions. The AVs utilize digital certificates to be 
authenticated and securely registered into the service. The 
message exchanges are securely protected with the encryption 
security mechanisms, and the solution enables to securely 
store, retrieve, analyze, and integrate data. 
V. DISCUSSION 
Considering the recent rapid advances and the respective 
security challenges, the reasoning in proposing a policy-aware 
architecture (PAArc) is to introduce policy-based management 
to facilitate the enforcement of the security policies to comply 
with the security objectives. One of the major challenges for 
smart M2M communications is to support a large device 
volume with various heterogeneous characteristics and 
different mobility profiles by meeting the resource constraints 
requirements. For instance, energy efficiency is a main design 
objective, and, thus, the smart M2M devices should operate 
efficiently with low latency, high resilience and high service 
reliability considering the critical nature of several smart M2M 
applications (e.g. in healthcare, critical infrastructures and 
transportation). The various security concerns mentioned above 
should be addressed, and we need to implement secure M2M 
services by design advocated with built-in security in the smart 
M2M nodes and the conventional application security 
solutions. In more detail, we need a policy enforcement to 
apply the appropriate security policies and to ensure data 
privacy and effective countermeasures in a dynamic 
environment.  
Our contribution in PAArc is that we manage to enforce the 
proper security policies in the smart M2M communications 
services to strengthen and improve a robust security 
management. Among several other security solutions, the 
access to sensitive data, the data confidentiality and integrity, 
and the entity authentication can be imposed with policy-based 
methods. In the context of distributed, multi-domain and often 
unattended M2M networks, we advocate that hierarchical 
policies offer an innovative security policy approach in policy 
composition, enforcement, validation, and conflict resolution. 
In these cases, various complicated issues also arise such as the 
semantic interoperability, the definition of concrete policies, 
multi-domain policy consistency, security policy refinement, 
and policy and completeness, which are not subject of this 
work. 
The proposed PAArc offers several enhancements in the 
service composition and improved information flows. First, the 
model-driven development facilitates the business intelligence 
and optimizes performance functionality. With the policy-
aware model, the certificate issuance policies can be used for a 
qualified subordination between different PKI hierarchies (i.e. 
recognize certificates by another CA that meet the certificate 
issuance requirements). Along with the ability to expose the 
functionalities, this model provides additional levels of security 
and robustness. The audit records are kept in the reporting 
system, which allows the construction of a comprehensive 
range of traceability and serviceability queries.   
In terms of manageability, the prototype of PAArc is re-
usable and enables the enforcement of security policies and the 
development of new functionalities easily and rapidly. Various 
requirements and service levels can be encoded with clear 
service descriptions for service reusability. PAArc optimizes 
the development efforts of different use case configurations 
(i.e. AV initial setup) and complex event processing to adapt to 
various factors and environments (i.e. moving to another place 
with diverging climatic and environmental conditions). 
Besides, PAArc supports message transformation with data 
translation from the canonical representation into the technical 
form, which simplifies the software structure needed for the 
implementation of the proposed model. Not only the 
combination of various service metadata is supported, but we 
also manage to increase the flexibility and integration 
capabilities with other service modules with data sharing.  
In terms of security policy enforcement, enhanced message 
security with respect to data confidentiality and integrity is also 
achieved. The data-origin authentication guarantees that the 
message has a distinct origin entity whilst entity authentication 
facilitates the communication entity to prove its legitimate 
identity. The smart M2M communications rarely rely on static 
node infrastructures and, thus, these communications require 
secure transport layer protocols to establish a reliable and 
secure end-to-end communication path. These enhancements 
and improvements along with the application security and 
management policies show the added-value of PAArc.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The high number of interconnected heterogeneous devices 
raises several security and scalability issues, as we need to 
employ the appropriate security countermeasures and policies 
to achieve the appropriate levels of secure services. In this 
paper, we described the ETSI functional M2M communications 
3-tier architecture with the addition of the policy enforcement 
across the domains. The proposed Policy-Aware Architecture 
(PAArc) facilitates the evolution of the appropriate security 
policies, and provides a secure interoperability between the 
device, network and application domains, and efficient 
monitoring mechanisms. Addressing and managing efficiently 
the security concerns for each domain of the proposed 
architecture with a policy tool and by incorporating the smart 
M2M service requirements, we manage to improve the security 
service levels of M2M communications. 
The use of policy-based management has several 
advantages in implementing adaptive smart M2M 
communications, where the network topology can dynamically 
change in response to the mobility of the interconnected 
objects. A policy-based management approach ensures the 
enforcement of the security policies to mitigate the security 
issues, the risks and improves the security controls and data 
privacy. The policy enforcement engine has access to the 
security policies and the additional information, and then 
applies the respective policies at fixed points in the device, 
network and application domains. Therefore, the establishment 
and the enforcement of clear and effective security and privacy 
policies are key issues to improve the offered service levels in 
smart M2M communications. 
Policy-based management fosters the enforcement of 
service-oriented cognitive technologies in smart M2M 
communications. In this regard, our future work will focus on 
the integration capabilities of the dynamic service registry, 
service location discovery, and the policy manager as the key 
functionalities of an integrated and secure policy-based 
architecture in smart M2M communications.  
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